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ABSTRACT 
Since the first Graphical User Interface (GUI) prototype was in- 
vented in the 1970s, GUI systems have been deployed into various 
personal computer systems and server platforms. Recently, with 
the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, malicious 
malware powered by AI is emerging as a potential threat to GUI 
systems. This type of AI-based cybersecurity attack, targeting at 
GUI systems, is explored in this paper. It is twofold: (1) A malware is 
designed to attack the existing GUI system by using AI-based object 
recognition techniques. (2) Its defensive methods are discovered by 
generating adversarial examples and other methods to alleviate the 
threats from the intelligent GUI attack. The results have shown that 
a generic GUI attack can be implemented and performed in a simple 
way based on current AI techniques and its countermeasures are 
temporary but effective to mitigate the threats of GUI attack so far. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity is a history of arms race, where a constantly evolv- 
ing cat-and-mouse game is played by attackers and defenders. The 
emerging computing technology of every new era has fueled attack- 
ers with new capabilities as well as an amount of vulnerabilities 
to implement their nefarious plots. When we are on the cusp of 
a new era: the artificial intelligence (AI) era, the shift to machine 
learning and AI will be the major progression in the next genera- 
tion of cybersecurity. In recent years, there is an increasing trend 
in using artificial intelligence, machine learning, data mining, and 
 
deep learning techniques in static and dynamic malware analysis, 
and anomaly detection [5, 24]. It is predictable that the AI technol- 
ogy will be used in more of greater importance in the near future. 
Even though, currently AI-based cybersecurity research is still in its 
infancy. In 2018, IBM researcher demonstrated the AI-based attacks 
and indicated the coming of next-generation cybersecurity threats 
[9]. Similar AI-based cybersecurity attacks [12, 21] were illustrated 
that the email compromise can occur by exploiting on machine 
learning and artificial intelligence. A neural network was the com- 
monly used hacking tool that can learn how to break into web 
applications [15]. Actually, these aforementioned techniques take 
advantage of the vulnerabilities of the existing system. However, 
none of them are related to AI-based GUI attack. 
From the perspective of computer security, any human’s habit 
/favorite in a computer system can be tracked by machine learn- 
ing and artificial intelligence because such habits /preferences are 
regarded as specific patterns susceptible to malicious learning ma- 
chines. Moreover, unfortunately such personal data are often open 
and unprotected. For example, when one uses his/her computer, 
the GUI is exposed. In case the computer was infected by AI-based 
malware, the personalized desktop information can be perceived 
and collected by the malware automatically. The article aims to 
demonstrate such an attack prototype where the victim’s desktop 
can be targeted by stealthy malware and the GUI properties can 
be exploited and recognized by the malware to perform a series 
of malicious attacks. As a typical example, the malicious malware 
could be able to stealthily identify what the user is operating over a 
bank website and it could launch an attack to automatically transfer 
money from a bank account to another account when the login 
buttons on the webpage were identified and a click event was trig- 
gered by the malware. In the current software configuration, the 
GUI software have no immunization from such a type of attack. 
Therefore, on the other side, the security community needs se- 
cured Apps or GUIs that are expected to be immune from such 
AI-based attacks. We cannot simply wait to start preparing our 
defenses until the attacks are found in the wild. To that effect, the 
AI-based attacks and new traits need to be identified and compared 
to traditional attacks. It would be beneficial to focus on monitoring 
and analyzing how AI-based attacks behave through user’s devices, 
and activating events when the user is taking routine actions. This 
article means to help identify this type of attack. Moreover, the 
future software engineering should have the feature that could 
prevent from automated AI-based attacks. The design of such a 
defensive method essentially is about to discover the vulnerabili- 
ties of current AI system. Adopting adversarial examples against 
data-driven AI systems was a novel attacking scenario targeting at 
AI vulnerabilities [19]. Thus, it also fits to prevent the attack from 
the AI-based malware. Adversarial examples are small perturba- 
tions in the input image to victim machine learning models where 
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an attacker has intentionally crafted the input data to trigger the 
machine’s recognition mistake/error while a human can still easily 
recognize the image without visionary impacts. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 intro- 
duces the latest techniques on the two sides of the arm race in 
AI-powered cybersecurity. Section 3 discusses the approach to per- 
form a GUI attack. Section 4 illustrates the effectiveness of the GUI 
attack. Sections 5 and 6 gives several methods to defend the GUI 
attack and their performance. At last, Section 7 concludes the article 
and makes a discussion about the future work. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
In 2017 DeepHack the open-source hacking AI learned how to 
break into web applications using a neural network, which can 
exploit multiple kinds of vulnerabilities, opening the door for a host 
of AI-powered hacking systems in the future [15]. In 2018 one of 
the most recent and advanced examples of AI-powered malware 
called DeepLocker was first demonstrated by IBM researchers [9]. 
The two breakthroughs have indicated that an arms race has been 
started between those who wish to attack and those who wish to 
defend neural networks with advancements in technology and a 
resurgence in artificial intelligence and machine learning. 
On the one hand, the benign-looking malware can stealthily 
and automatically collect and analyze the attributes of targeted 
subjects with normal looking and behavior so that pattern based 
anti-malware software is not eligible of finding them. These mal- 
ware such as DeepLocker also can provide a concealment method 
for the cybersecurity attack based on the deep neural network to 
generate a key according to user’s attributes [9]. In recent years, 
there has been an influx of research into artificial intelligence and 
neural networks on cybersecurity. As typical examples, researchers 
used AI and deep learning on intrusion detection over traditional 
network traffic [1, 8, 18, 24] and even in-vehicle networks [22]. 
Rege and Mbah summarized the applications that Machine Learn- 
ing made to cyber crime, including several aspects: Spear Phishing, 
Unauthorized Access, and Evasive Malware [16]. Crafting email 
using AI techniques was illustrated in 2015 by Palka et al. [12]. 
A business email compromise attack was demonstrate in 2017 to 
show a technical exploits on machine learning and artificial intel- 
ligence [21]. Zhang et al. proposed a stealthy attacking method 
targeting Voice Assistant on smart phones by using an Intelligent 
Environment Detection module to hide the attack from being no- 
ticed by users and choose an optimal attacking time [27]. As a 
commonly used technique, the neural networks are not only used 
to predict and detect the network intrusion through KDD traffic 
dataset [18, 24] but also utilized to generate cryptographic keys 
according to user’s attributes illustrated by IBM DeepLocker. Due 
to the highly complex nature of the neural network, even if the 
malware had been found, it would be very difficult for malware 
analysts to determine who or what the malware was searching for. 
Without knowing these things, it would be impossible to decipher 
the trigger condition, meaning that the payload would never be 
unlocked and remain unable to be studied [9]. Meanwhile, the open- 
source AIs have been widely used by hacker, further lowering the 
hacking cost. DeepHack used the open-source hacking AI to learn 
how to break into web applications [15]. In the recent literature 
of 2019 [23], researchers discovered that considerable information 
on companies and individuals can be easily gained by attackers by 
using open source intelligence that increases the threat of targeted 
attacks. Open-source libraries were also employed to conduct a 
low-cost attack on cyber authentication system [19, 25]. 
On the other hand, much work has been done in the space of 
adversarial examples, proposing and classifying various types of 
attacks such as black-attacks, in which the attacker does not know 
anything about the structure of the network [20] as well as white- 
box attacks in which the attacker has some knowledge about the 
structure of the neural network. It has also been found that ad- 
versarial examples are transferrable among almost any artificial 
intelligence model. Shukla et al. first found that adversarial exam- 
ples were transferable between the same neural network being 
trained on different data sets [20]. Meanwhile, Papernot et al. found 
that an adversarial example that effectively fools one model will 
most likely fool a completely separate model in the same manner 
or fashion [13]. This is critical for black-box attacks as an attacker 
can use a substitute model to generate adversarial examples and 
then transfer them to the model in which they are invoking the 
attack. Yuan et al. explored possible defenses and countermeasures 
that could be employed against adversarial examples. Bayesian clas- 
sifiers and Gaussian Processes were used to propose new neural 
networks called Gaussian Process Hybrid Deep Neural Networks 
[26]. These networks were found to be comparable to general deep 
neural networks in performance, yet more robust against adversar- 
ial examples [26]. 
Since the essence of adversarial examples is an attack against 
the blind-spot of the neural networks, the improvement in the ro- 
bustness of the neural network is the countermeasure against such 
an attack. Neural network robustness can be evaluated in a few 
different ways. One such way is to attempt to prove a lower bound, 
or generate attacks that can demonstrate an upper bound [4]. The 
former method, while effective, is much more complex to imple- 
ment in the physical world. With the latter, if the attacks used on 
the neural network are not strong enough, an upper bound may not 
prove useful [4]. Another powerful method to increase robustness 
of a neural network is defensive distillation. Defensive distillation 
is motivated by the goal to reduce the size of either Deep Neural 
Network (DNN) architectures or ensembles of DNN architectures 
[14]. Doing this allows for the reduction of computing resource 
needs and in turn allows for deployment on resource constrained 
devices such as a smart phone [14]. This technique is done by ex- 
tracting the class probability vectors that are produced by a DNN 
and transfer them to a second DNN of reduced dimensionality dur- 
ing training without observing a loss of accuracy [14]. Furthermore, 
Carlini and Wagner claimed that defensive distillation was no more 
resistant to targeted misclassification adversarial examples than an 
unprotected neural network and they have showed that with slight 
changes to the attack model, they could achieve successful targeted 
misclassification  [3]. 
 
3 APPROACH OF GUI ATTACK 
3.1 Malware Design 
The main objective of the malware was to detect, recognize, and 
locate icons on the victim’s GUI such as desktop and tray/task bar, 
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specifically web browsers, and then signal the click event to these 
icons so that the login information stored by the victim in the web 
browser can be taken advantage of by the malicious malware to 
steal the victim’s asset. For the purpose of prototype demonstration, 
we choose to stealthily log into the victim’s Blackboard account as 
our goal. The targets are Windows users who have either one of the 
Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, Opera browsers or 
all with their user login information saved into the user name and 
password field respectively. The more browsers the user has the 
better the attack would be; if the user has more than one browser 
then the chances of detecting the browser would be high. The mal- 
ware will execute successfully if the the victim of the malware has 
internet connection, at least one of the browsers, their information 
saved in their blackboard login web page on Microsoft Windows 
10. 
The malware may be implemented in two ways: one is based on 
AI-powered object detection model and another is implemented on 
non-AI based method. The malware is specifically made to detect 
all the four browsers. With this ability, the detection of a browser 
on a user’s computer desktop and tray/taskbar becomes an easy 
and efficient task. Once an icon is detected, move to the location, 
open the detected browser and execute the attack by logging into 
the victim’s Blackboard account. 
If a browser was not detected on the tray/task bar, the malware 
may see the possibility that the user’s desktop might have some of 
the browsers after all windows were minimized. After doing this 
and there was no detection then the start menu would be opened 
and the link would be entered straight into the start menu search 
box and searched. When the computer opened the link with its 
default browser, then it logged in the user and execute the attack. 
The work flow of the malware is demonstrated in Figure1. 
 
3.2 Object Recognition Model 
It has shown on Figure1 that the object detection is located at the 
center of the malware, determining the success of an attack. Ten- 
sorFlow Object Detection (TOD) model is used as the component 
recognition in our framework to detect icons and perceive their lo- 
cations. Open-source TensorFlow detection model repository offers 
a magnitude of models, able to be trained further and integrated into 
image recognition work, in which faster regional Recurrent-CNN 
inception [17] was scored high in both accuracy and reasonable 
computation speed. Thus, after integrating the pre-built model to 
our detection program, we trained the model and extracted location 
information for feeding the coordinates to our malware program, 
which ensures high accuracy in object detection. 
The TOD detection model used on top of our recognition model 
was built using Google object detection directory within the Tensor- 
Flow repository. Figure 2 illustrates the loss over a 10,000-iteration 
period for training this detection model. It shows how quickly each 
of the icons individually approached an optimal loss value as well 
as the loss value of training all icons together. The main loss graph 
of interest can be found at the top left identified as the classification 
loss. This loss determines the overall accuracy of how well the 
model performs given how low the loss value is after a specified 
number of iterations. The ideal loss value to reach was at or be- 
low, 0.05. In almost all of the Loss Graphs, the loss value quickly 
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Figure 1: The Work Flow of GUI Malware 
 
approached 0.05 at around 4 to 5 thousand interactions. Due to 
the training script that was used however, checkpoints were only 
saved every 10 min, and about 3k iterations were accomplished in 
those 10 minutes. So for the model, the ideal inference graph to be 
exported for classification was around 5 to 6 thousand interactions. 
If the Inference graph was exported at 3 thousand, the model might 
not have been as accurate as it could be because it could be trained 
to reach a loss value lower than 0.05. However if one exports the 
inference graph of the checkpoint that was saved at 8 to 9 thou- 
sand iterations, one runs the risk of running a model that wrongly 
classifies objects due to overfitting. In Figure 2, classification loss is 
the loss between the detection and a set of icons; localization loss 
is the loss of wrapping box around the character and its real loca- 
tion; RPN loss is the loss of combining the previous classification 
and localization losses; objectness loss is the loss of classification 
based on the bounding boxes; total loss is the total loss between 
classification, localization, RPN localization, and objectness losses; 
clone loss is the same as the total loss. 
3.3 Data Acquiring and Labeling 
In order to acquire data for training purposes, a python data creation 
script was made that helped facilitate this process. Approximately 
200 images were captured per each icon for basic training in order 
to acquire the ability to perceive the icon on the screen. 100 of those 
images were trained based on the much smaller tray icon, and the 
Start 
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Figure 3: (A) 300 by 300 cropped tray icon image and (B) 300 
by 300 cropped Desktop shortcut image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Loss Over Training Iterations 
 
 
other 100 images were trained based on the larger desktop shortcut 
icon. Meanwhile, a transparent .png of the icon were placed at the 
exact cursor position. Once the transparent .png was masked onto 
the image, a 300 x 300 crop is immediately generated around the 
transparent image as the training data set. 
After all of the data are acquired, it is needed to label for the 
supervised learning. The labeling was done using an open source 
program called Labelimg. This program helps generate an .xml 
file with the exact coordinates of the bounding box placed around 
the icon. The name of the .xml file has the exact name as the .png 
version. When all of the images are properly labeled, 20% of the 
images are placed in a test folder and the rest of the 80% are kept 
in a training folder. 
After properly segmenting the data into the correct folder, a 
script is run to convert all of the .xml files to their corresponding test 
and train .csv files. This is necessary to create TensorFlow records 
corresponding to the test and train data, which is a converted 
binary file format that helps increase the performance of the model. 
Meanwhile, another script is used to generate these TensorFlow 
records before the model is ready to be trained. 
4 EFFECTIVENESS OF GUI ATTACK 
The performance of the GUI attack depended on the predictive 
accuracy of the object detection model. Thus, first we evaluated the 
performance of the recognition model itself. Then, we compared 
the performance of two implementations for the GUI attack: one 
was implemented by AI model and another was implemented by 
non-AI model. 
4.1 Tests of Object Detection Model 
Four tests were uniquely generated with screenshots that contained 
all possible detected objects. The final average test combined all 
four tests to show the overall performance of the tests. Two envi- 
ronments were tested on, detecting icons that were displayed in 
the system tray at the bottom of the window as well as the Desktop 
environment, as shown in Figure4. The Tray and Desktop environ- 
ments differ on two key fundamental factors. The first factor is size, 
the tray icons are noticeably smaller so detection will be harder for 
the tray icons in comparison. The second factor is the fact that the 
icon shortcuts on the Desktop environment contain a small arrow 
indicating that it is a shortcut. For this reason, half of the training 
data consisted of shortcut icons and half of the training consisted 
of the tray sized icons to allow for enough varied data for proper 
detection. 
Looking at each icon independently, Chrome and Firefox seemed 
to be the most consistently detected icons in comparison to the 
Edge and Opera icon. One reason why this could be, would be due 
to the simplistic nature of the Edge and Opera Icon. The Edge icon 
at its basic level is a blue E, while the Opera icon is just a red O. 
For this reason, misdetection was higher when testing different 
screenshot environments. In Test 3 in Figure4, the chrome icon was 
misdetected as the opera icon at 75% as denoted as (O). 
The model tests have shown that the confidence level of recog- 
nition is very high with the average more than 95% in both desktop 
and tray icons except the Chrome in the tray, in which we calcu- 
lated the average excluding Test 3 denoted as *. The recognition 
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malware to perform an effective and accurate attack against GUI 
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each location that template is slid across, a metric is calculated so 
it gives a result which will yield how accurate or similar the area is 
compared to the template image. 
The comparison between non-AI method and AI-based method 
is demonstrated on Figure5. The AI-based malware was executed 
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Figure 4: Results of the Model Tests. (o) denotes it misclassi- 
fied as Opera. * denotes the average taken by Tests 1,2& 4. 
 
4.2 Non-AI Approach vs. AI-Powered Approach 
Python libraries such as OpenCV, YOLO, Single shot detectors and 
many more were investigated by us. However, the OpenCV library 
is chosen as the alternative non-AI method to compare with our AI- 
based object recognition method, which is based on the following 
knowledge. (1) It is known as Open Source Computer Vision and 
Machine Learning Library. (2) It was built to provide a common 
infrastructure for a computer vision application and accelerate the 
use of machine perception in the commercial products. (3) It also 
makes it easier for businesses to utilize and modify the code because 
of it being a BSD-license product. The template matching, a non- 
AI method from OpenCV library, is used for comparison to our 
AI-based method. Template matching is a technique for finding 
areas of an image that match (are similar) to a template image. This 
method takes two inputs which are the source image (the image 
containing the image to be detected) and the template image (the 
image that will be detected in the source image). The goal of this 
method is to detect the highest matching area. So, in order the for 
the method to find this, it compares the two images by sliding the 
template image against the image source; the template image is 
moved at one pixel at a time from left to right and up to down. At 
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Figure 5: Non-AI Method (template match) Vs. AI-powered 
Method in Recognition Accuracy of GUI Attack 
 
5 DEFENSIVE  METHODS 
5.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method 
According to the literature [19] published in Jan 2019, it was an 
innovative way to take advantage of adversarial examples to spoof 
AI-based attacks. Adversarial examples are forged inputs to a neural 
network, resulting in an incorrect output from the network. In order 
to find the adversarial examples that can lead to the misclassification 
in a malicious learning machine, the approximate search algorithm 
such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10] was adopted in 
the research. 
A perfect AI system is expected to be capable of predicting the 
correct class y of any given input x. In an AI-powered network 
intrusion detection system, the input x represents the features of 
the network packet, such as protocol, service, destination, source, 
connection, and so on. The class y indicates the class of attack, 
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which can be a binary value or multiple classes depending on the 
requirement. For an ideal AI system, the expectation of the model 
error e between the prediction y1 and the truth y0 is optimized to 
the minimum. 
In an AI system, internal architectures are hard to access but 
data can be available. Assuming that the same training data can 
be shared by attackers and the AI system, an adversarial exam- 
ple x∗ is defined by perturbing an originally correctly classified 
input x. Finding x∗ is reciprocal with a constrained optimization 
problem. The adversarial sample x∗ causes the most expected loss 
(prediction error) to reflect the classification error that is subject 
to a constraint on the minimum deviation from the original in- 
put x. That is, the smallest modification causes a misclassification 
x∗ = x + arдmin  z  : f  x + z   = t  , where z is the perturbation 
of input, z is the norm of perturbation, and t is the target class 
different from f  x [7]. 
In order to find the adversarial examples that can lead to the mis- 
classification, the adopted Gradient-based approximate search al- 
gorithms in this project include Limited-memory Broyden –Fletcher 
–Goldfarb –Shanno (L-BFGS), the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), 
and the Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA). 
The L-BFGS method was used for computer-vision model to mis- 
classify an image where an imperceptible non-random perturbation 
was added. L-BFGS can be revised by using the Adam optimizer 
to reduce the size of the perturbation [4]. The downside of both 
methods is the high computing cost. However, it is hard to make a 
trade-off between computing cost and effectiveness. In practice, it 
is reasonable to modify L-BFGS by simply running the L-BFGS in 
less iterations to have a less expensive cost at a lower accuracy. 
Compared with L-BFGS, FGSM is an approach with a lower 
computing cost [10]. FGSM can maximize the prediction error 
and keep the size of input perturbation. The adversarial exam- 
ple can be formulated as x∗ = max Jf (x) subject to ∥x∗ − x ∥∞, 
sudden disturbances in the image. To add Salt-and-Pepper noise to 
an image, we calculate the noise for a given pixel i, j, k as Noise 
i, j, k; p , where i, j, k represents the original, intact pixel value 
and p represents the noise density value [11]. With Salt-and-Pepper 
noise, we have progressively dark pixels present in bright regions 
of the picture and vice versa [9]. 
 
5.3   Poisson and Speckle Noise 
Our third chosen technique of noise addition was Poisson, also 
called Photon noise. Appearance of this noise is often the result 
of the statistical nature of many electromagnetic waves such as 
x-rays, gamma rays, and visible light [9]. Sources have random fluc- 
tuations of photons resulting in an image with spatial and temporal 
randomness [9]. Finally, the final image technique we worked with 
was the addition of Speckle noise, also known as multiplicative 
noise. The probability density function of Speckle noise follows a 
gamma distribution [2] and this type of noise can exist in an image 
similar to Gaussian noise [9]. 
 
6 PERFORMANCE OF COUNTERMEASURES 
Figure6 shows the results of several countermeasures against the 
GUI attack. The adversarial examples created through FGSM was 
effective in preventing the neural network from recognizing our 
web browser icons. For example, in our tests using Google Chrome, 
with the resize sub-method, the image classifier was unable to 
recognize the icon. The resize method is to enlarge the object first 
to feed the TOD model since it is so small in size and shrink the 
enlarged image into the original size after the FGSM operation. 
Alternatively, the pad and crop method is to pad the original icon 
with background color and to crop the object only after the FGSM 
operation. 
In the case of the pad and crop method, the classifier was able 
x ∗ where Jf is the way to measure the ected loss (prediction error). to recognize the chrome icon with 77% confidence. Upon testing 
By substituting Jf with a first-or exp series approximation our methods with Microsoft Edge, with the pad and crop method, 
 and taking the gradient at x, der Taylor the equation is further formulated we had a result of 67% confidence in recognition. Using the resize 
asx∗  = x  + ϵsiдn(▽x Jf (x, y)), where matrix Jf    =   ∂ft  
l   
is the 
method resulted in our image classifier being unable to recognize 
the Edge icon. The resize method on Firefox gave us a result of 
Jacobian matrix. The Taylor series expansion uses the linear ap- 
proximation and incurs a lower running time. 
 
5.2  Gaussian and Salt-and-Pepper Noise 
The original image is still easily recognizable to a human after 
Gaussian noise is added. Since Gaussian noise is a form of additive 
noise, in which each pixel in the noisy image is the sum of the 
true value of each pixel and a random, Gaussian distributed value. 
The noisy image is described by A x, y = H x, y  + B x, y  where 
A x, y is the function of the noisy image, H x, y is the function of 
image noise, and B x, y is the function of the original image [2]. 
The Gaussian noise we added to the chrome icon had a mean value 
of 0 and a sigma value of 20.0. 
In addition to this, we also tested a slightly lower standard devi- 
ation value of 15. Another form of noise we tested in our research 
is Salt-and-Pepper noise. Salt-and-Pepper noise is also commonly 
known as impulse valued noise or data drop noise due to the sta- 
tistical drop of original pixel values [9]. It results in sharp and 
the network being unable to recognize the icon while the pad and 
crop method provided approximately 75-80% confidence. Finally, 
in our testing of the Opera icon, were found approximately 65% 
recognition confidence while using the pad and crop method. For 
the resize method, we found that the Opera icon was recognized 
sometimes with a confidence of around 75-80%, and in rare cases, 
it was recognized as Microsoft Edge with around 77% confidence. 
As a result of our testing using FGSM, we were in most cases able 
to drastically lower the ability of our neural network classifier 
to identify web browser icons. In each of these tests, once the 
perturbed icon was pasted into the original input image, the icon 
on the background image was still very recognizable to human 
eyes, which meets the main criteria of our experiment. 
As for Gaussian noise added to the original images, we were able 
to lower the classifier’s confidence level in recognition by differing 
amounts. The amount of drop-in confidence level depended on 
how much noise we wanted to add to the image. For Chrome, we 
needed a bit more Gaussian noise than the other icons to drop the 
confidence of recognition by the same levels. Using a distribution 
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with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 20, the image was still 
easily recognizable by a human while the icon was recognized by 
the image classifier with a confidence level of around 81-85%. The 
noised image with a standard deviation of 25 cannot be recognized 
by the recognition model. It seems that the more noise added in it, 
the harder the image classifier was able to recognize it. However, 
it is harder for human eyes to recognize it. For Microsoft Edge, a 
standard deviation of 15 was enough to bring confidence level of 
recognition to 82%, followed by the icon being unrecognizable at a 
standard deviation of 20. Next, for Mozilla Firefox, using a standard 
deviation of 15 dropped confidence level of recognition to 86%, and 
a standard deviation of 20 bringing it further down to 75%. Finally, 
in the case of the Opera icon, there were some unique results. The 
standard deviation of noise required to lower the confidence level 
of recognition to 75% was only 3. At a standard deviation of 4, the 
neural network was unable to classify the perturbed opera icon 
at all. Actually, When the standard deviation is increased to 5, the 
network misclassified the perturbed Opera icon as a Firefox icon 
with a confidence level of 76%. Thus, from these results, we believe 
that to some extent using Gaussian distributed noise can be an 
effective and alternative method to defend from AI-powered GUI 
attack. 
Applying salt-and-pepper noise to our image was not quite as 
successful in blocking the neural network from identifying Google 
Chrome icons within the image. During our testing of the object 
detection network using an image generated with salt-and-pepper 
noise, the neural network was able to distinguish the icon for Google 
Chrome with an 88-90% confidence level. For Microsoft Edge, the 
confidence level of recognition hovered at around 95-97%. Mozilla 
Firefox required a slightly larger amount of noise than other icons to 
drop the confidence level to 80%. As for the Opera icon, the addition 
of salt-and-pepper noise was completely ineffective in reducing 
the confidence level of recognition by the neural network. When 
adjusting the amount of noise in the image, the Salt-and-Pepper 
method of noise addition was quite variable. A small edit to the 
noise function could drastically change the image. If the level was 
chosen such that the icon was still recognizable, the confidence 
level of recognition hovered between 80 and 95 percent. With more 
change to the noise function, the icons were almost unrecognizable 
to the human eye and because of this, the image classifier was also 
unable to recognize the icons. 
Slight changes to the value of lambda in the Poisson function 
caused large changes in image perturbation. For example, we used 
a lambda value of 500 to run this image through the classifier, the 
chrome icon was unrecognizable to the neural network. Although 
the chrome icon was still recognizable to humans, it looked so 
noised. Using a much smaller lambda value of 100, the image was 
recognized by the neural net with the confidence of 88% , however, 
the pixel colors were drastically reversed. Microsoft Edge, Firefox 
icon, and Opera have the similar effect when applying lambdas 
of 500 and 100 respectively. At this point in time, it showed that 
Poisson distributed noise was an effective method of fooling our 
image classifier to some extent but so much noise made the image 
hard to recognized by human eyes. 
After creating and adding the speckle noise to the Google Chrome 
icon and pasting it back into our background image, the icon was 
almost completely overpowered by the noise. The shape of the icon 
was still the same, but was not so recognizable as chrome to the eye 
in any way. This directly led to the image classifier being unable to 
recognize the icon as well. In two out of the four icons we tested, 
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speckle noise completely overpowered the image: Google Chrome 
and Mozilla Firefox. For Microsoft Edge and Opera, they are still 
recognizable to the human eye after the addition of speckle noise. 
However, since we want our adversarial icons to still be easily rec- 
ognized by the human eye for all cases, speckle noise is not a viable 
option in our experiment to fend off a GUI-Attack from an AI image 
classifier. 
explainability of a learning machine to mitigate the security threats 
from the algorithmic defect of machine learning. 
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